This text addresses one of the fundamental questions of ontology: the origin of subjects, specifically the so-called primordial subjects (subjects of the first order). The author critically examines the relationship between virtual events and their transition into the realm of actuality. The core problem lies in the fact that a virtual event cannot create its own subject, as it would already require a subject to perform any action. The author rejects the traditional concept of the "subject-object split" (Subjekt-Objekt Spaltung) as an insufficient explanation that merely relocates the problem to a different conceptual context. Instead, it is proposed that the primordial subject emerges through a specific split into internal and external aspects. These two sides are integrated into a unified, actual subject at the moment of transition from virtuality to actual existence. The text thus emphasizes the process of subject formation as an internal integration of opposing aspects, illuminating the ontological boundary between the virtual and the real world.