This text analyzes the ontological status of the concept as a tool of human thought. The author argues that concepts lack independent existence or external "being"; instead, they are constitutive elements of subjective mental activity. Accessing concepts is only possible through reflection on one's own thinking processes. The text draws a distinction between the "grasping concept," which is an active performance of the subject, and the "grasped concept," which functions as an abstract construct, such as geometric or mathematical objects. While these constructs exhibit relative stability and identity over centuries, they are not real entities found in the physical world. The author suggests a terminological refinement: the term "concept" should be reserved for the internal activity of thinking, while the resulting constructs should be viewed as distinct mental objects. Using the example of a triangle, the text demonstrates that the properties of an object cannot be attributed to the concept itself. The study contributes to the philosophical debate on the relationship between thought and its ideal objects.