This text examines the nature of the "object" of thought, categorizing intentional entities (whether objects or non-objects) as either primarily independent of or dependent on the act of thinking. A central premise is that every object is inherently thinkable, though thinkability does not guarantee an entity's actuality or its capacity to exist independently of the mind. The author explores the concept of "thinkability" as a relative quality, fundamentally determined by the specific mode or type of thinking employed. For instance, non-objective realities might remain entirely unthinkable within an objectifying framework of thought, yet potentially accessible through alternative intellectual approaches. The discussion excludes the problematic notion of unthinkable non-objects, reserving it for separate inquiry. Ultimately, the piece argues that the boundaries of what is thinkable are not fixed but are shaped by the structural characteristics of the cognitive process, highlighting the dynamic relationship between the thinking subject and its intentional correlates.