This text addresses the fundamental philosophical problem of subjectivity and agency, arguing that subjectivity cannot be perceived as mere immanence. Instead, it must be understood through intentionality, where consciousness is characterized by its inherent ability to transcend itself and aim toward something external that is not its component. Without this relationship to the "other," consciousness would fail to relate even to itself. Drawing on Hegel’s concept of the Absolute Spirit, the author illustrates that self-awareness requires an act—the active positing of a "non-I" such as nature or history. The core argument advocates for generalizing this model: the constitution of a subject at any level depends on a proto-act through which an "event" steps outside of itself. The text proposes a systematic exploration of the event-based structure by which an event forms its own subject. Ultimately, the work calls for a deeper ontological appreciation of how consciousness and subjectivity are established through the dynamic process of self-transcendence and active externalization into the world.