The text explores the philosophical concept of life as a phenomenon given to the human subject immediately and without mediation. Drawing on Kant’s term "thing-in-itself," the author argues that life represents the only entity to which we have direct access, specifically because we experience it as our own living existence. Unlike the mere external manifestations observed in other objects, our own life is accessible internally without requiring external observation. However, the text highlights a fundamental paradox: while life is experienced directly, its theoretical and conceptual grasp remains profoundly problematic. It can only be "intended" indirectly, through a detour via other concepts, as life itself resists traditional intentional definition as a fixed or delimited object. This analysis opens complex questions regarding the relationship between subjective experience and objective knowledge within the contexts of modern ontology and phenomenology. The abstract examines the tension between the immediacy of lived experience and the difficulty of theoretical reflection on the very essence of being, thereby contributing to a broader discussion on the possibilities and limits of human understanding regarding living reality and its authentic manifestations.
Život a jeho projevy
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◆ philosophical diary – record, Czech, origin: 15. 1. 2011
- This is a part of the original document:
- 2011
Život a jeho projevy
„Život“ je v jistém smyslu – vypůjčíme-li si Kantův termín – jediná „věc o sobě“, ke které máme přímý přístup, totiž právě tím, že žijeme, že život prožíváme jakožto svůj vlastní život, aniž bychom byli odkázání pouze na jeho „projevy“. A zároveň je můžeme „mínit“ jen jakoby „oklikou“, přes něco jiného tedy nikoli „pojmem“ spjatým s intencionálním předmětem(objektem).
(Písek, 110115-1.)