The text addresses the classic philosophical problem of the relationship between oneness and multiplicity in the context of the "beginning." The author responds to Barbora Řebíková's question regarding the origin of multiplicity if unity exists at the start. It is argued that while this problem has been central since ancient Greek philosophy, it may be fundamentally misunderstood. The proposed solution lies in the conceptual distinction between objectness and non-objectness. Non-objectness evades quantification; therefore, the distinction between "the one" and "the many" lacks justification in its traditional sense. If the "beginning" is understood as a process of realization and objectification, we must accept a multiplicity of beginnings. However, when inquiring into the nature of the beginning prior to any objectification, the distinction between unity and plurality becomes illegitimate. The text emphasizes the need for new conceptual tools to develop non-objectifying thought, which bypasses traditional quantifying categories to offer a deeper understanding of the beginning beyond objective logic and ontology.