This paper examines the nature of consciousness and its relationship to individual acts of consciousness. Consciousness is interpreted here not as an active subject or agent, but rather as an abstract sphere, space, or specific environment within which concrete conscious processes occur. The author emphasizes that the terminological phrase "acts of consciousness" must be understood primarily as "consciously performed acts." A key argument is the rejection of the notion of consciousness as an independent subject that actively performs these acts. The text further suggests a methodological analogy between the integrity of acts of consciousness and the integrity of biological functions, allowing for a better understanding of the interconnectedness and functioning of these processes within a whole. The study focuses on the ontological definition of consciousness as a necessary framework for human experience and action, while critically redefining traditional concepts of subjectivity in the context of phenomenological or psychological inquiry. The aim is to clarify how individual acts are integrated into the broader framework of conscious experience without personifying consciousness itself.