This document presents a critical analysis of the conceptual relationship between moral and legal guilt, specifically addressing and refining the arguments proposed by Václav Němec. The author challenges the notion that moral guilt is a broader category that inherently encompasses legal guilt, suggesting instead that these two spheres are distinct and only partially overlap. By examining instances where criminal acts may be morally neutral or even virtuous—particularly under unjust legal systems—the text demonstrates that legal culpability does not always equate to moral wrongdoing. Invoking the classical principle "summum ius, summa iniuria," the analysis highlights how the rigid application of law can result in profound injustice. Consequently, the document calls for a necessary revision of the definition of guilt to better reflect the potential discrepancies between legal codes and moral imperatives. It emphasizes that a nuanced understanding of these tensions is essential for a comprehensive evaluation of human conduct within both judicial and ethical frameworks.