This text examines the ontological nature of the concept as a non-objective reality that finds realization through actual acts of thought. The author explores the reconstitution of the intentional correlate, which, although closely linked to the concept, is not its objective side. A central theme is the specific type of intentionality characteristic of conceptual thinking, distinguishing it from the general intentionality inherent in all life. The act of "meaning" is described as a "pseudo-event" because it lacks internal, organic integrity and must be organized externally by the subject. The analysis emphasizes that the connection between the psychic performance and its correlate is not spontaneous but dependent on the subject's activity. This distinction allows for a precise definition of conceptual thinking within broader structures of activity, differentiating it from pre-living and living processes. The work contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between subjectivity, intentionality, and the process of meaning constitution.