This text explores the phenomenological concepts of the "I" and "selfhood," focusing on the relationship between the existence of the subject and its self-awareness. The author argues against the notion that the Self is constituted by or within consciousness. Although achieving self-consciousness is a developmental milestone reached through social interaction, the Self must logically precede any conscious act for those acts to be attributed to a specific subject. The text critiques perspectives, such as Sartre's interpretation of Husserl, which position consciousness as the primary "absolute fact." Instead, it emphasizes that the Self exists even where self-awareness is impossible or where the basic conditions for consciousness are absent. The Self is thus viewed as an ontological constant, independent of whether it is accessible through reflection or phenomenological reduction. This perspective fundamentally re-evaluates traditional understandings of subjectivity by asserting that the "I" is an absolute fact prior to any realization in consciousness.