This text critically examines the nature of theoretical assumptions and their role in scientific thought. The author highlights the specific trajectory of European thinking, which, since ancient Greece and the subsequent rise of modern science, has focused on the mathematization and technization of reality. Within this framework, conceptual tools are often treated as mere instruments meant to function efficiently within logical calculus and empirical observation. Scientists frequently neglect the reflection on their own foundations as long as existing models serve practical purposes. From a philosophical perspective, however, every scientific theory rests upon a set of hidden, unspoken assumptions that escape the methodological apparatus of the science itself. The author argues that these uncritically accepted foundations represent the primary weakness of scientific theories. When such assumptions are philosophically challenged, scientific discourse often retreats into pragmatism, thereby marginalizing deeper inquiries into the validity of its premises. Uncovering these prejudices is thus an essential task of philosophical reflection, which transcends the boundaries of specialized disciplines.