This text explores Emmanuel Lévinas's concept of "non-intentional consciousness" as presented in his essay "La conscience non intentionnelle." The author critically examines the validity of the distinction between intentional and non-intentional consciousness, highlighting the difficulty of defining a conscious act that lacks any relational focus. While traditional phenomenology, particularly Husserl's, views consciousness as inherently consciousness of something, the author proposes the inclusion of "non-objectifying intentions." These intentions are not merely a lack of intentionality but represent an active openness toward that which is "coming"—the not-yet-realized. The text critiques the fixation on "presence" found in Lévinas and the broader European tradition, emphasizing the distinction between the "givenness" of existing things and the appeal of non-existent realities that call for our assistance in their realization. Non-objectifying intention is thus viewed as a performance that facilitates the transition from a mere appeal to a future reality, moving beyond the classical framework of intentionality focused on objective existence.