This text provides a critical analysis of Francis Fukuyama's thesis, which links the question of human rights with the concept of a so-called "universal civilization." The author argues that such a connection is fundamentally flawed as it conflates distinct levels of reality. The recognition of human rights does not inherently lead to the adoption of specific, fixed civilizational priorities; rather, the core of the idea of human rights lies in emphasizing diversity and the plurality of their application. The article examines the ontological—or more precisely, "meontological"—assumptions of universality, asserting that universal human rights must not be tethered to specific cultural, legal, or social norms. Such an association would de facto negate their universal nature. The author calls for a radical departure from the notion that any civilization can be universal by claiming superiority or acting as the sole guarantor of universality. True universality must remain independent of any specific civilizational framework to maintain its validity and foundational purpose.