This text addresses the issue of diverse conceptions of truth throughout the history of philosophy and explores how the validity of truth theories themselves can be evaluated. The author criticizes the assumption that truth can be captured through mental models or intentional objects, an approach typical of the correspondence theory of truth. The central argument is that truth is neither a thing nor an object; therefore, any conception based on an intentional object necessarily fails to represent actual truth. The text highlights a profound aporia: if every concept is inherently linked to a model, that model cannot resemble actual truth, which is essentially non-objective. The author suggests that the only way out of these contradictions is a fundamental restructuring of our cognitive apparatus and conceptual frameworks. It is necessary to transform the way we relate to "pure non-objectivities," a category to which truth belongs. Only through this intellectual transformation can we overcome the limitations of traditional theories and achieve a proper philosophical relationship with truth itself, without reducing it to a mere object of study.