This text critically examines Hegel's conception of "Spirit" (Geist) as the result of its own activity and contrasts it with the author's own definition of the "Subject." While Hegel posits that Spirit constitutes itself by negating immediacy and returning to itself, the author argues that the Subject must necessarily precede its activity, as any activity is inherently its own from the start. Consequently, the Subject cannot create itself ex nihilo but can only transform its character through practice directed toward external objects. The author identifies a fundamental internal contradiction in Hegel's view unless it implies the Absolute Spirit or a hidden substance within. A central distinction is made between the Subject's non-objective aspect, which is received rather than controlled, and its objective aspect, which is shaped and modified through practical activity. Ultimately, the text emphasizes the limitations of self-creation and the necessity of an ontological foundation that precedes the Subject's actions and development.