This document critically examines the traditional correspondence theory of truth (adaequatio rei et intellectus), drawing on Heidegger's formulations and their medieval theological foundations. The author questions the feasibility of comparing a thing and a statement, arguing that the notion of adequacy is a construction of conceptual thinking which necessitates a distance between thought and its object. The text proposes a revised triad consisting of the thing, the concept, and the intentional object, where the concept serves as a mediator, causing the thing to be perceived merely as an object. A central critique is that the correspondence model marginalizes the active subject and the role of practice. Influenced by Marx's discovery of practice, the author suggests an alternative where truth is understood not as a static agreement, but as a non-objective reality and a normative 'ought-to-be.' Subjective activity thus constitutes the world-relation, opening a space for truth to penetrate worldly affairs, moving beyond epistemological relativism toward a dynamic, action-oriented conception of truth.