This paper explores the relationship between the logicality of argumentation and the concept of violence, drawing on Jacques Derrida's treatise "Metaphysics and Violence." It examines whether logic itself can be perceived as a form of violence exerted upon the minds of others, particularly within the context of scientific inquiry, where results often possess a "coercive" character. The analysis extends beyond mere argumentation to the constitution of cognitive tools and linguistic structural elements that shape thought through established usage. The text further distinguishes between actual violence and the powerful attractiveness of linguistic forms or the tendency toward imitation, which may mimic coercion without being identical to it. The author emphasizes the necessity of clarifying the definition of logicality and its relationship to logos and speech. Ultimately, the paper questions whether early forms of communication and logical structures should be labeled as violent, suggesting instead that they possess features of self-imposition and an irresistible attractiveness inherent in new communicative modes.