This scholarly article provides a critical analysis of Pavel Materna’s interpretation of Bernard Bolzano’s concept of the 'proposition-in-itself'. Materna posits that by abstracting from the physical or mental manifestation of a sentence, one can isolate the proposition-in-itself. The author contests this view, arguing that a sentence exists as a linguistic and logical entity only when it is understood—making it inherently a thought sentence. To abstract from thought is to create a flawed fiction rather than an objective reality. One cannot and must not abstract from thinking itself, but only from the peripheral and distracting elements of a specific mental process. A genuine concept is inextricably linked to the intentional act. If the intentional act is set aside, only the intentional object remains, and the concept itself is lost. Ultimately, the text addresses the challenge of how to theorize concepts without succumbing to the traditional tendency of objectification and reification of non-physical entities.