This text explores the fundamental ontological and epistemological distinction between a geometric figure and its corresponding concept. The author argues that while a triangle as an intentional object possesses spatial properties such as sides, angles, and centers of gravity, the concept of a triangle lacks these attributes entirely. The significance of the conceptual level lies in its ability to reveal logical relationships and hierarchies of generality that cannot be grasped through mere intuition or the visualization of geometric shapes. For instance, the inclusion of the concept of an equilateral triangle within that of an isosceles triangle, and subsequently within the general triangle, is a conceptual truth rather than a purely geometric observation. The text emphasizes that the level of generality is accessible only by moving from figures to their concepts. Ultimately, it advocates for a strict differentiation between the concept and its intentional object, drawing on the philosophical foundations laid by Edmund Husserl, Franz Brentano, and Bernard Bolzano regarding the constitution of mental objects.