This text presents a profound philosophical reflection on the ontological status of myth (mythos) compared to what are termed "true beings" or "true events." While true beings reveal their immediate form and actuality in time independently of any external observer or agent, myth exhibits a fundamentally different structure. It lacks internal integrity; instead, it is always integrated from the outside by an active subject. Even when myth subsequently dominates or subjugates the subject, its foundational integration remains external. Consequently, the author argues that myth cannot strictly be described as a phenomenon in the sense of a self-showing appearance. The appearance of myth is unique because that which appears does not show itself as an internally integrated whole. Therefore, the nature of myth is not self-evident, and its conceptual definition requires a significantly more systematic and thorough justification than is necessary for internally integrated entities. This inquiry points toward the necessity of a new methodology for understanding myth as a specific type of non-phenomenal appearance that challenges traditional frameworks.