This text explores the fundamental philosophical question of what it truly means to "intend an object," or to focus one's consciousness and thought upon a specific entity. The author critically challenges the common reliance on everyday experience as a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. It is argued that the mere fact of performing an action does not inherently mean we understand its essence, nor does it guarantee awareness of the act itself. The reflection further extends into the problem of subjectivity, questioning the identity of the "I" or the self. Who is this entity that could potentially possess such awareness? The document thus opens a discourse on the boundaries between acting and knowing, and between the subject and the object within the framework of intentionality. This analysis highlights the complexity of the relationship between the thinking subject and the intended object, suggesting that it transcends empirical evidence and necessitates a deeper ontological investigation into the structure of conscious existence and the nature of self-knowledge in the context of perceiving reality.
[Mínit „objekt“]
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◆ philosophical diary – record, Czech, origin: 3. 12. 2013
- This is a part of the original document:
- 2013
[Mínit „objekt“]
Co to znamená, mínit „objekt“ (tj. soustředit své vědomí, myšlení, mínění na nějaký „objekt“ čili „předmět“)? Na tuto otázku rozhodně nelze odpovědět poukazem na tzv. zkušenost, tj. na to, že přece každý víme, co to znamená, protože to každodenně děláme. To, že něco děláme, ještě zdaleka neznamená, že také víme, co to děláme, ba dokonce to neznamená ani to, že vůbec víme, že to děláme (nehledíc už k tomu, že tu zůstává otázka, kdo to jsme „my“, resp. kdo to jsem „já“, tedy kdo by to vůbec mohl vědět, kdo by si to mohl uvědomovat).
(Písek, 131203–1)