This reflection examines the concept of panpsychism and its relationship to the author’s philosophical system. Responding to claims that his views align with panpsychism, the author clarifies his position using the Aristotelian definition of “psyche” as an internal source of motion. However, he cautions against conflating this internal motion with biological life. Drawing on Teilhard de Chardin’s distinction between the “living” and the “pre-living,” the author rejects the existence of entirely dead or inert matter in the universe. Instead of panpsychism, he proposes the concept of “general reactibility” as an inherent property of every true, internally integrated being. This reactibility is attributed even to fundamental physical entities such as quanta or superstrings, without ascribing to them life or a soul in the traditional sense. The text argues that the capacity to react is a fundamental characteristic of being, rather than evidence of a psyche. This approach allows the author to bridge the gap between physics and philosophy, suggesting that activity and response are constitutive elements of all reality, from the smallest particles to complex organisms.