This text explores the historical context and deep philosophical foundations behind older Czech terminology for natural sciences, specifically the terms 'přírodozpyt' and 'přírodopis'. The author argues that these designations reflect a lingering distinction between descriptive and experimental sciences, a divide deeply rooted in ancient Greek philosophical traditions. This perspective was most sharply formulated by Aristotle, who defined 'pure' or true knowledge as a form of passive contemplation or observation, during which the knower must remain entirely inactive and avoid any goal-oriented performance or subjective activity. The text challenges this classical view by asserting that such passive observation is fundamentally impossible in the realm of modern science. It contends that all forms of human cognition and knowledge acquisition are inherently active processes that require significant concentration and intentional effort from the researcher. Consequently, the act of observation is presented not as mere gazing, but as an active engagement. The distinction between active and passive science is thus dismissed as an outdated prejudice, emphasizing that scientific inquiry always involves the subject's activity.