The text examines the role and limitations of neologisms within philosophical discourse. The author argues that when existing terminology proves inadequate, the introduction of a new term serves only as a weak and temporary substitute. This temporality stems from two primary factors. First, as a new word enters common usage, it inevitably acquires connotations beyond its creator's intentions, since its meaning is inextricably linked to a vast network of other established words. Second, the perceived necessity of a neologism often indicates a fundamental flaw in the prevailing mode of thought and expression. Therefore, merely adding new terms is insufficient; a meaningful shift requires a deliberate transformation of the connotative structures of existing language. The author concludes by questioning the philosophical validity of constructing extensive new terminologies or artificial languages. Such systemic interventions are viewed as dubious because true philosophical progress necessitates a revaluation of the entire linguistic framework rather than the mere expansion of vocabulary.