The text explores the concept of directedness and teleology within the framework of philosophical inquiry into goals. The author critically re-evaluates the traditional Aristotelian perspective, which views finality exclusively as an orientation toward a pre-determined goal acting as a causa finalis. Opposing this reductive view, the text proposes a special problem of teleology where the goal (telos) is not given in advance and thus cannot be understood as a prior cause of movement. The argument suggests that the progression of events cannot be strictly derived from the past through efficient causality, nor can it be dismissed as mere coincidence. The author highlights the need to investigate a new type of teleology where the outcome is decided "on the move" during the process itself. This form of directedness is neither determined by the past nor purely accidental; instead, it represents a dynamic orientation where the goal is constituted within the movement, offering a synthesis that transcends both strict causal determinism and random contingency.