This text explores the nature of science and critically examines Karl Popper's principle of falsifiability as the sole criterion for scientific validity. The author argues that while the requirement for refutability may serve a practical role within specific scientific contexts, it cannot be regarded as the definitive measure of what constitutes science. Adopting falsifiability as an absolute criterion would lead to either the exclusion of significant realities from scientific inquiry or the denial of their existence, both of which undermine the essence of scientific endeavor. The text distinguishes between knowledge that remains currently unrefuted and fundamental principles that serve as necessary preconditions for scientific work. These principles, such as quantification or specific geometric frameworks, cannot be falsified in the traditional sense; they can only be replaced by alternative models. The paper highlights the inseparable connection between science and those foundational principles that, while not meeting Popper's criteria, remain indispensable and legitimate components of scientific progress.