This text examines Leibniz's conception of the relationship between being and unity, proceeding from the thesis that a true being must be inherently unified. The author analyzes the distinction between a mere aggregate, or heap, and true unity, which can be either simple or complex. Drawing on Leibniz's Monadology and his early work on the principle of individuation, it is shown that complexity does not hinder unity but rather establishes the individuality of a being. Individuality is understood here not as physical indivisibility, but as ontological integrity: the division of such a complex unity leads to its liquidation and transformation back into a mere collection of separate beings that were originally unified. The paper thus clarifies Leibniz's metaphysical definition of individuality, where being and unity merge into a single whole, the disintegration of which destroys the very essence of the being. In this way, the text defines a clear boundary between organic unity and the mechanical sum of parts within Leibniz's Baroque metaphysics.