This text examines the concept of "non-objective intentions" within the framework of Husserlian phenomenology and critically addresses the notion of consciousness without intentions. Starting from Husserl’s term "unfulfilled intentions," the author suggests that every active intention is inherently unfulfilled, as fulfillment terminates the intentional process. The core of the argument lies in distinguishing between intentions directed toward given objects and those oriented toward the non-given or "non-objects." The author posits that objective and non-objective intentions coexist in every act of consciousness. He challenges Lévinas's proposition regarding consciousness devoid of intentions, arguing that even states like "mood" require reflection to constitute consciousness. The text concludes that non-objective intentions are not empty but represent a specific sensitivity to non-objective challenges. By insisting that intentions can target non-objects without being void, the author broadens the traditional understanding of intentionality, maintaining that consciousness is fundamentally intentional even when it transcends the realm of objects.