This text explores the necessity of narrativity within conceptual thinking, asserting that purely formal structures are insufficient for constructing extensive and complex discourses. The author argues that even Ancient Greek philosophers, despite their rationalistic rejection of myth, could not fully dispense with narrative elements—a reality that persists even in modern formal logic, such as Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. While Plato partially recognized the limits of conceptual thought, his approach inadvertently allowed for the subsequent restoration of mythic tendencies. The article warns that rehabilitating narrativity often carries the risk of reviving what Landsberg calls mythologisms. Therefore, it is crucial to exercise caution: while narrativity is a necessary tool for organizing philosophical discourse, it must be carefully distinguished from a regression into uncritical mythology. The defense against the dangers of mythologisms should not result in the rejection of narrativity itself, as it remains an indispensable component of human reasoning and communicative integrity.